I construct a heterogeneous agents economy that mimics the time-series behavior of the US earnings distribution from 1963 to 2003. Agents face aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks and accumulate real and financial assets. I estimate the shocks driving the model using data on income inequality, on aggregate income and on measures of financial liberalization. I show how the model economy can replicate two empirical facts: the trend and cyclical behavior of household debt, and the diverging patterns in consumption and wealth inequality over time. In particular, I show that, while short-run changes in household debt can be accounted for by aggregate fluctuations, the rise in household debt of the 1980s and the 1990s can be quantitatively explained only by the concurrent increase in income inequality.
This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents to study the trend and the cyclical properties of household debt in a unified framework. 1 Explanations for the decline in macroeconomic volatility have referred to good monetary policy, good practice (like better inventory management) and good luck (reduced volatility of the underlying economic shocks). Finally, explanations for the rise in microeconomic volatility have included shifts in the relative supply of and demand for skilled workers, changes in economic 1 Throughout the paper, I refer to household debt as the total outstanding debt of households and nonprofit organizations (which are grouped together in the Flows of Funds Accounts). Household debt is the broad category that includes all credit market instruments issued by households, mainly home mortgages (72% of the total as of year-end 2003) and consumer credit (21%). Residual categories include Municipal Securities, Bank
Loans not elsewhere classified, other loans and advances and commercial mortgages. The discussion here does not consider business and public debt nor does it take into account the net foreign asset position of the United States. 2 The increase in earnings inequality has been apparent in any dimension of the data (pre-tax and post-tax, between and within groups, along the permanent and transitory components). The earnings inequality series I use is the one constructed by Eckstein and Nagypál (2004) using data drawn from the March Current Population Survey, and refers to the standard deviation of pre-tax log wages of full-time, full-year male workers. Measures of inequality constructed by other authors and based on different datasets or different samples show the same pattern.
institutions, and technological change.
To date, no study has tried to connect the patterns in economic volatility with the behavior of household debt. There are several reasons, however, to believe that the forces driving aggregate and idiosyncratic developments in the economy play a major role in affecting the need of households to access the credit market. This is the perspective adopted here. At the aggregate level, macroeconomic developments should affect both the trend and the cyclical behavior of debt: over long horizons, as countries become richer, their financial systems better allocate the resources between those who have funds and those who need them; in addition, over the cycle, borrowers' balance sheets are strongly procyclical, thus generating credit to move together with economic activity.
At the cross-sectional level, the arguments are different: if permanent income does not change, but the income pattern becomes more erratic over time, agents will try and close the gap between actual income (which determines current period resources) and permanent income (which affects consumption) by accessing their financial assets more often. When one aggregates all financial assets across the population, market clearing implies that they sum to zero, but their cross-sectional dispersion increases. Aggregate debt -which is sum of all the negative financial positions -rises when income dispersion is greater.
The above stories are very stylized, but ultimately lead to the main question of the paper:
how do the shocks hitting the economy's income and its distribution across agents affect the behavior of its credit flows? I address this question by constructing a dynamic general equilibrium model of the interaction between income volatility, household sector financial balances, and the distribution of expenditure and wealth. The model ingredients are extremely simple: heterogeneity in discount rates and borrowing constraints for some of the agents. Starting from the deterministic steady state of the model, I then hit the economy with idiosyncratic income shocks, financial shocks (changes in the tightness of the borrowing constraint) and aggregate shocks. I use these shocks because they can be somewhat easily backed out from the data and because they appear to be all plausible candidates to explain either the trend or the cycle in household debt.
Households are assumed to be representative of the US economy: they receive an exogenous income, consume durable and non-durable goods, and buy and sell a riskless bond in order to smooth utility. An (exogenous) fraction of the households is assumed to have unrestricted access to the credit market, which they use in order to smooth expenditure in the face of a time-varying income profile. The remaining households are assumed to be impatient and credit constrained, in that they can only borrow up to a fraction of the collateral they own.
At each point in time, the economy features aggregates (like average income and average consumption) that move in line with macroeconomic aggregates; at the same time, one can see,
given the time-varying behavior of income distribution, how the individual stories shape up the distribution of consumption, of wealth and financial assets. More in detail, and using annual observations on income inequality, I estimate the stochastic processes for the idiosyncratic income shocks which are capable of replicating the behavior of income inequality over time.
Using data on loan-to-value ratios and productivity, I estimate processes for "financial" shocks and aggregate income shocks. I then consider the role of these shocks in explaining qualitatively and quantitatively the patterns in the data, in particular the trend and the cyclical behavior of household debt and the distribution of consumption and wealth across the population. The key finding of the paper lies in the ability of a heterogeneous agents model to explain two salient features of the data:
1. On the one hand, the model explains the timing and the magnitude of rise in household debt over income, and attributes its increase to a increase in income inequality.
2. On the other, the model can reconcile the sharp increase in income inequality over the period 1984-2003 with a smaller rise in consumption inequality, and a larger increase in wealth inequality.
The model is solved approximating the equations describing the economy (optimality conditions and market clearing conditions) around the deterministic steady state, and finding the decision rules for each agent by the method of undetermined coefficients. This approximate solution technique has the upshot that, even when the number of agents in the economy is very large, the decision rules can keep track of all the moments of the wealth distribution. However, an important limitation of this technique is that the solution displays certainty equivalence property, thus neglecting the effects of risk on optimal decisions. In particular:
1. In the deterministic steady state of the model, the distribution of financial assets is partly indeterminate. On the one hand, agents with high discount rates hit their borrowing limits, and this pins their total financial positions down. On the other, however, one needs to circumvent the problem that the distribution of financial assets among unconstrained agents is potentially indeterminate, unless one uses some trick. The one I pull out is to assume that agents who are not credit constrained face a very small quadratic cost of deviating from an exogenously given initial asset position. This asset position is chosen in a way that aggregate net debt (the sum of all financial positions across all agents, constrained and unconstrained) is zero, while gross debt (the absolute value of the sum of the negative positions) is equal to the data counterpart.
2. In the deterministic steady state, I rule out precautionary saving motives. Wealth accumulation is therefore lower than in the stochastic case for all agents.
3. In a neighborhood of the steady state, the assumption of certainty equivalence implies that patient agents behave like permanent income consumers. Impatient agents, instead, being borrowing constrained, behave in a "rule-of-thumb" fashion, consuming a constant fraction of their income and rolling their debt holdings over forever.
How would the results change if one were to calculate the exact, non-linear equilibrium of the model in which shocks are fully anticipated? Computational complexity is a major hurdle here. 3 In a separate note (Iacoviello, 2005b) , I provide evidence based on non-linear simulations of two-agent versions of the model presented here: an economy with two patient agents only, each bound by a natural debt limit; an economy with one patient and one impatient agent, bound by an ad-hoc collateral constraint. In the patient agents' economy, consumption of each agent follows approximately a random walk, unless one of the two agents comes very close to (because of a series of bad income realizations) his natural debt limit. 4 When one of the agents starts with a debt to income ratio close to 1, for realistic income processes the natural debt limit is almost never approached. 5 In the patient-impatient economy, if the impatient agent starts at the borrowing constraint, he might escape from the constraint after a sufficiently long series of positive income shocks. How often this happens depends on impatience, income volatility, and risk aversion. However, if the agent is impatient enough, he hits the borrowing limit with probability one. These findings, of course, warrant further investigation. Taken together, however, they suggest that the certainty-equivalence solution of the model with a large number of agents can offer a good approximation of the full, non-linear model.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 briefly describes the patterns in the data.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes the calibration and the simulation of the model. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 discusses the results, and Section 6 concludes.
1. Household debt and earnings inequality in the US The credit market works as follows. A fraction of the agents (unconstrained, patient agents)
can freely trade one-period consumption loans. The remaining agents (constrained, impatient agents) cannot commit to repay their loans, and need to post collateral to secure access to the credit market. Instead, unbacked claims are enforceable within patient agents, whose credit limits are so large that they never bind. For all agents, the amounts that they are allowed to borrow can be repaid with probability one, and there is no default.
On the income side, agents differ in the scale of their total endowment which, absent shocks, can be thought as the source of permanent inequality in the economy. Income differ-entials across agents are completely exogenous. 6 For each agent, the log income process is the sum of three components: (1) an individual-specific fixed effect; (2) a time-varying aggregate component; (3) a time-varying, individual component.
Patient Agents
A fraction n N of the agents have a low discount rate (patients) and do not face borrowing constraints (unconstrained): alternatively, one can think that their borrowing limits are so large that they do not bind. Each of the patient agents maximize a lifetime utility function over consumption and housing given by:
where i = {1, 2, 3, ..., n} , where c is consumption and h denotes holdings of housing (whose services are assumed to be proportional to the stock). The flow wealth constraint and the income process are respectively:
where b it denotes borrowing of agent i at the market interest rate R t .
In the income specification above, f i is an individual specific fixed effect; a t denotes a macroeconomic component; and z it denotes an individual-specific, idiosyncratic component.
The term:
represents a very small quadratic cost of holding a quantity of debt different from b i (that will be the steady state debt): this cost is needed in order to pin down steady state asset holdings of each patient agent, but has no effect on the dynamics of the model. 7 For each agent, the first order conditions for this problem involve standard Euler equations 6 In the model, I refer to income and earnings inequality interchangeably excluding any gain/loss from interest payments from the income/earnings definition. 7 In the data, there is secular growth in incomes. I detrend log real income in the data using a bandpass filter procedure that isolates the frequencies between 1 and 8 years. The same trend in income is used to detrend real debt, so that the ratio detrended real debt over detrended real GDP is identical to the ratio of the nonfiltered series. All the model parameters that potentially depend on the income trend (like β and γ) must be read as incorporating this trend.
for consumption and durables as follows:
In the solution procedure, I obtain the decision rules by assuming that these agents' asset position is such that they are never close to their maximum borrowing limits. This procedure is safe if their natural borrowing limit (the one which is consistent with positive steady state consumption) is large enough relative to their wealth, a condition which is assumed to hold throughout the paper.
Impatient agents

A fraction
N−n N of the agents is assumed to discount the future more heavily than the patient agents and to face a liquidity constraint that limits the amount of borrowing to a time-varying fraction of their durables assets. With this simple assumption, I want to capture the idea that for some agents enforcement problems are such that only real assets can be used as a form of collateral. The problem the impatient agents solve is:
where i = {n + 1, n + 2, ..., N} , where γ < β, subject to the following budget constraint:
where again
and the borrowing constraint is:
For each unit of h they own, impatient agents can borrow at most m t : exogenous time variation in m proxies for any shock to the economy-wide supply of credit which is independent of income, as in Ludvigson (1999). The first order conditions can be written as:
The first-order conditions for the impatient agents are thus isomorphic to those of patient ones, with the crucial addition of λ it , the Lagrange multipliers on the borrowing constraint.
It is straightforward to show that, in a neighborhood of the non-stochastic steady state, these agents will be borrowing constrained: so long as γ < β, the multiplier λ on the borrowing constraint will be strictly positive. 8 
Equilibrium
Notice that only patient agents pay the bondholding adjustment cost (which equals zero in steady state). When the goods market clears, Walras' law also implies that the bond market
Dynamics
To study the dynamics of the economy, I consider the following experiment. I assume that, before 1963, the economy is in steady state. There are then unexpected shocks to detrended aggregate income, to the loan-to-value ratio m and to the individual incomes. These shocks are constructed from actual data so that their sequence matches the behavior of aggregate earnings, loan-to-values and earnings inequality. In particular, aggregate income and loan-to-values are assumed to obey the following autoregressive representation: 9 log a t = ρ a log a t−1 + e at
where the e's are normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance, and m ss is the steady state value of m. At the individual level, I hit the agents with a sequence of idiosyncratic income shocks that follow:
The variable e it is iid across agents but not over time: in practice, the cross-sectional variance of the individual income shocks is allowed to be time-varying. By virtue of the law of large numbers, these shocks only affect the distribution of income, but not its mean level (see the appendix B for more on this: because the cross-sectional variance of the shocks is time varying, one needs to correct the cross-sectional mean of e it so that the mean level of income remains constant over time; otherwise aggregate income would be high in periods of high idiosyncratic variance).
3. Calibration and simulation
Overview
To check whether the model can account for the main stylized facts in the data, I then use the following procedure:
1. I set the fixed effects in the income process in a way to match the year-1963 standard deviation of log incomes.
2. I calibrate the structural parameters of the model, so that the initial steady state matches key observations of the US economy in the year 1963. In detail, I set the parameters describing preferences and technology (β, γ, δ, j) so that in the initial steady state the ratio of durable wealth to income and the interest rate roughly match the data.
3. Once I choose m, the model endogenously generate a steady-state ratio of aggregate debt holdings for the constrained agents. Next, I choose the b i 's in the bond holding cost function so that the aggregate bond market clears
and that the gross household debt to total income matches the data in the initial steady state, where gross debt is defined as:
In 1963, the ratio of household debt to personal disposable income was 0.66. Hence, I choose a distribution of b i 's such that:
debt held by unconstrained agents 5. I feed the estimated shocks into the model decision rules starting from the year 1963, and check whether the time series generated from the model can replicate the cyclical and trend behavior of debt, consumption inequality and wealth inequality which are observed in the data.
Calibration
The time period is set equal to one year. This reflects the lack of higher frequency measures of income inequality, which are needed to recover the processes for the idiosyncratic shocks. Table 3 .1 summarizes the calibrated parameters. As explained above, these parameters are meant to capture the initial steady state distribution of income and financial assets, as well as the ratio of durable wealth to output. Given that patient agents are unconstrained in steady state, I set their discount factor to 0.965: this pins down the real interest rate at 3.5% per year.
The durable/housing preferences weight j is chosen to match the steady state stock of structures over output that is found in the data. A choice of j = 0.1 implies that the housing stock is worth 1.4 times annual income in the initial steady state. Together with the housing depreciation rate of δ = 0.03, this also ensures that steady state residential investment is about 5% of annual income. The discount factor for impatient agents is set at 0.9 (see Iacoviello, 2005 for a discussion). The fixed effects in the earnings process are chosen so that the standard deviation of log earnings is 0.5173 in the initial steady state.
The share of unconstrained agents is set to 65%: this is a value in between the range of estimates in the literature: using aggregate data, Campbell and Mankiw (1989) estimate a fraction of rule-of-thumb/constrained consumers around 40 percent. Using the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, Jappelli estimates a 20 percent of the population to be liquidity constrained. Iacoviello (2005) finds that a share of constrained consumers of 34% is necessary to account for the positive response of spending to an aggregate housing price shock.
I then pick the loan-to-value ratios. In 1963, the average loan-to-value ratios for new homes purchases was 0.73. Setting the initial value of m to this number, this generates a ratio of debt held by constrained agents to total output of 31%.
As outlined in the previous sections, the distribution of financial assets among unconstrained agents is chosen so that net household debt is zero, whereas gross total household debt matches its 1963 value of 0.66. To obtain such distribution, I proceed as follows. Unconstrained agents are 65% of the population. I split them in unconstrained creditors and unconstrained debtors, and assume that creditors are 35% of the total (and claim 66 percent of the total debt), debtors are 30% of the total (and own 66 − 31 = 35% of the debt). This is roughly in line with data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) that indicate that only a small fraction of the population has positive net financial assets. 10 Next, I assume that financial assets (for the unconstrained creditors) and liabilities (for the unconstrained debtors)
are both lognormally distributed with same standard deviation as that of log incomes: this way, the overall wealth distribution is more skewed that the income distribution, as in the data. Once the distributions are created, I have to decide the joint probability distribution of burden, that reduces their current period resources.
3.3.
Recovering the stochastic processes for the shocks 3.3.1. The income shock I extract the income shock from the log real personal disposable income series. First, I use a bandpass filter which isolates frequencies between 1 and 8 years to remove the trend component.
The resulting series is then assumed to follow an AR (1) process and used to construct the log (a t ) process, shown in the top panel of Figure 2 . The resulting series has the following properties:
log a t = 0.54 log a t−1 + e at , σ ea = 0.024
and is positively correlated with the usual business cycle indicators: in particular, it shows declines in the periods associated with NBER-dated recessions. The top panel of Figure 2 plots the implied time series for the shock processes normalized to zero in the year 1963.
The financial shock
It is hard to construct a single indicator of the degree of financial intermediation and of the ability of impatient agents to access the credit market. In practice, financial liberalization in the United States has been a combination of a variety of forces which no single indicator can easily capture. Therefore, any indicator is likely to proxy only imperfectly for the timevariation in the degree of tightness of the borrowing constraint. Because it comes closest to proxying for the model counterpart, I take the loan-to-price ratio on conventional mortgages for newly-built homes as a measure of financial shocks. This way, I can construct a measure of time-varying liquidity constraints, which gives me the process for m t . 11 As shown in the 11 Other measures of financial innovation, like the homeowner share of equity share in their home, the percent of loans made with small down-payments, or meaures of credit availability from the Fed Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey suffer from two main problems: first, they are more likely to suffer from endogeneity problems; bottom panel of Figure 2 , loan-to-value ratios have increased only by a small amount relative The series for m (normalized to 0 in the base year) is plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 2 .
The idiosyncratic shocks
Appendix B describes in detail how I use the observed measures of time-varying income inequality (when measured by the cross-sectional variance of log incomes) in order to recover the idiosyncratic shocks that are consistent with given variations in income inequality, once assumptions are made about the persistence of the individual income process. Here I briefly summarize my procedure: in the initial steady state, income dispersion is given by the variance of the log-fixed effects, var (log y ss ). Over time, the cross-sectional log-income dispersion evolves according to:
that is, income dispersion comes partly from the past, partly by new innovations. Given assumptions about ρ z , one can use the time-series data on var (log y t ) to construct recursively the time series of the cross-sectional variance v 2 t of the individual shocks. Given the vector v 2 t , one can then draw from a normal distribution, in each period t, a N ×1 vector of the individual innovations having standard deviation equal to v t .
A crucial parameter determining the behavior of the model is therefore ρ z , the autocorrelation in the individual income process. Various authors have estimated this parameter using data from the PSID. Heaton and Lucas (1996) allow for permanent but unobservable household-specific effects, and find a value of ρ z = 0.53. Recent studies, like Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004), estimate a much higher value of ρ z = 0.95. These studies also estimate v t , the variance of the innovation process, which here is time-varying in order to match observed cross-sectional variation in incomes. I take a value in between these number and choose ρ z = 0.75. In Section 5, I document the robustness of my results to various alternatives values of ρ z .
second, and more important, they suffer from a scaling problem: while they are likely to be very good qualitative indicators of credit availability, they are harder to map into a quantitative indicator that can be fed into a model. Given the data of Figure 1 on var (log y t ) and given the assumption on ρ z = 0.75 , I can construct time-series for the individual income processes that allow to replicate the behavior of income dispersion over time. Because each draw of idiosyncratic shocks leads to slightly different results, I report in the next sections data on the median result across 500 replications, and, when applicable, I plot in the Figures the 10th and 90th percentile for all the simulated model statistics.
Some caveats
1. An assumption that I am making is that the steady state in 1963 features no crosssectional dispersion in earnings due to temporary factors. As inequality grows over time and shows lots of persistence, I can almost in every period back out the sequences of iid shocks {e it } with variance v 2 t that solve equation (1) given the observed behavior of var (log y t ). This is doable so long as inequality is not falling over time; suppose, for instance, that inequality were below its baseline in t + 1 = 1964: to match the model with the data, I should assume negative correlation between the {e it } shocks and the fixed effects.
2. An implicit assumption of the model is that, at the individual level, individual face starting from 1963 a sequence of income shocks whose variance is increasing over time. agents behave like hand-to-mouth consumers, reacting to positive income shocks by borrowing more, and being forced to cut back on borrowing in the face of negative income shocks. 12 Figure 3 plots the typical income, consumption and debt profiles over the simulation period for one constrained and one unconstrained agent. Across agents, the average correlation between debt and income level is −0.29 for the unconstrained agents, 0.93 for the constrained ones. As in many incomplete market models, individual consumption is much more volatile than aggregate consumption: the average standard deviation of unconstrained agents individual consumption is 2.5 times that of aggregate consumption; for constrained agents, the corresponding number is about 8, thus suggesting that self-insurance does not work well for this group.
Aside from these individual stories, there is one important consequence of the aggregate implications of varying cross-sectional income dispersion. In the plots of Figure 3 , one can notice how income become more erratic from the 1980's on, reflecting the model parameterization that captures by construction the rising earning inequality in the data. Because consumption of the unconstrained agents will move less than earnings, the increased dispersion of earnings will lead to a larger dispersion of financial assets.
Main findings
The model successfully captures the trend behavior of debt over income.
The data show a rise of the debt-income ratio from 66 percent in 1963 to 113 percent in Figure 4 compares the behavior of debt to income ratio to its data counterpart. The increase in wealth inequality is instead much larger: 14 this is explained by the fact that rich people in the model become on average even richer and accumulate this way positive financial assets over time. 15 4. The model attributes the trend increase in debt to a rise in inequality.
2003.
A closer look at the sources of shocks in the model highlights the role of income inequality as the leading cause of the increase in debt over income from 1984 on.
To understand why, consider the time pattern in income inequality. In particular, the strong acceleration in inequality of the early 1980s is what drives up, according to the model, the pattern of debt growth in the 1980s.
To disentangle the relative contribution of each of the shocks in explaining the timeseries behavior of household debt, Figures 9 and 10 show the historical decomposition of the debt/income ratio and the debt growth in the model in terms of the three model shocks. 16 Figure 9 shows that the trend variation in debt can be accounted by the behavior of income inequality. Had income inequality not changed from its baseline value, the ratio of debt to disposable personal income would not have increased to its current levels. Financial shocks -as measured by the model -can explain about 5 percent of the increase in debt over income. And cyclical variations in productivity, by their own nature, should not have affected long-run trends in debt. Figure 10 illustrates that income and financial shocks seem to account well for the positive correlation between 13 See also Autor, Katz and Kearney (2004) . 14 In the simulations, I find that the fraction of agents with negative wealth, which is about 5% at the beginning, rises to about 15% at the end of the sample period. The final number is roughly in line with the data: for instance, Kennickell (2003 , Table 4 Kennickell, 2003) . 15 Trends in wealth inequality in the data are hard to establish, although it seems that wealth inequality increased dramatically in the 1980s and remained high in the 1990s. See Cagetti and DeNardi (2005) . 16 Because of the sampling uncertainty associated with the draws of the idiosyncratic shocks, I report 90%
confidence bands for the time-series generated from idiosycratic shocks only.
model debt growth and the data counterpart, although the timing of the financial shocks seems unable to capture cyclical movements in debt growth.
To conclude: given the calibrated income processes, the model successfully captures the cyclical and trend dynamics of debt on the one hand, and consumption and wealth inequality on the other: this is especially remarkable, since I have not used these data as an input of my calibration.
Robustness
I performed a number of robustness checks by changing the parameter values within the context of the benchmark specification. The basic finding from the experiments is that the increase in debt which can be quantitiatively accounted for by the rising earnings dispersion is very robust to alternative parameterizations of the model. In particular, it holds when the number of agents rises up to N = 500, 17 and it also holds when the income share of the unconstrained agents is assumed to be larger than its benchmark value of 65%. However, as the share of unconstrained agents becomes larger, the model generates lower correlations between debt and the data at cyclical frequencies: this is to be expected, because a non-negligible chunk of credit constrained agents is key in determining procyclical debt growth.
Two experiments deserve special mention. In the first experiment, I verify the robustness of the results to the initial correlation between income and financial assets. This is important for two reasons: on the hand, as mentioned in Section 3.2, there is little evidence on the data counterpart to this variable in the 1962 (the earliest) Survey of Consumer Finances; on the other, quadratic cost aside, the model fails to generate an endogenous steady state distribution of financial assets, so it is important to verify how crucial the initial conditions are in shaping the subsequent dynamics of the economy. In the second experiment, I study the sensitivity of the results to the degree of idiosyncratic income persistence.
Varying the correlation between income and financial assets
Because the model does not endogenously generate an initial distribution of financial assets among unconstrained agents, it is natural to ask how its results depend on the initial conditions, namely on who is a borrower and who is a lender in the initial steady state of the model. group, this correlation is 1, since borrowing is a constant fraction of housing holdings, which are in turn a constant fraction of income). One extreme case is the one in which one assumes that rich people are the wealthiest in terms of financial assets (first row of the table): this version of the model predicts an increase in debt that is slightly smaller than the benchmark case: intuitively, this happens because it takes some time before they start accumulating positive assets. One result of the simulation is in fact that, regardless of the initial conditions, the last simulation period features lower (higher) correlations between debt (financial assets) and income than the initial steady state.
The logic of this extreme case clarifies how the results change when the initial correlation taken on different values. The higher the initial correlation between debt and income, the larger the rise in debt over income that the model predicts. respectively as a function of the degree of individual income persistence. The last column reports the sample correlation between year-on-year debt growth in the data and in the model.
Varying the persistence of the income process
The interesting result of Table 5 .2 is that the increase in debt that is predicted by the model is a non-monotone function of the persistence of the individual shocks. Starting from an autocorrelation of income shocks around 0.85, more persistent shocks reduce the need to smooth consumption and to accumulate debt or assets via access to the credit market. When income shocks are instead transitory, agents smooth more often their consumption, but their relative position along the income ladder changes substantially every period, and so does their demand for financial assets. Because the distribution of financial assets is continuously reshuffled, debt does not display persistence at the aggregate level. Figure 11 plots their inequality measure 18 against the inequality measure used in this paper. When seen from a long-term perspective, it is hard to tell whether the recent rise in inequality is a permanent phenomenon 18 The series is available at http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/w8467/w8467-app.xls.
(which could be accounted for by long-term shifts in the demand for skilled workers) or a temporary one (which could be explained by fiscal policies, changes in social norms, or other factors). Indeed, as argued for instance by Piketty and Saez (2003) , one could claim that the rise in inequality of the 1980s and 1990s is only part of long-term cycle, just like the rise in inequality between the two World Wars. 19 
Conclusions
This paper has investigated to which extent a heterogeneous agents model that mimics the distribution of income can explain the dynamics of household debt which have characterized the US economy in the period 1963-2003. The main finding of the paper is that the rise in income inequality of the 1980s and the 1990s can account at the same time for the increase in household debt, the large widening of wealth inequality and the relative stability of consumption inequality. 20 On the consumption inequality result, one paper which is related to mine is Krueger and Perri (2005) . They argue that, in the data, consumption inequality has risen much less than income inequality. They present a model of endogenous market incompleteness in which the incentive to trade assets is directly related to the uncertainty faced at the individual level. They
show that only such a model is able to predict a modest decrease in within-group consumption inequality alongside an increase in between-group consumption inequality. In the model presented here, the mechanism through which consumption inequality rises less than income inequality in an expansion of credit from the (temporarily) richer to the (temporarily) poorer agents. It is important to stress, however, that the model here is not able to generate steady states in which consumption inequality is lower than income inequality, as in Krueger and Perri (2005) : rather, the purpose of my exercise is to show how the smaller increase in consumption inequality that we have seen in the period under exam can be rationalized through a larger access to the credit market.
Regarding the fit of the model, endogenous labor supply and collateral prices both seem plausible candidates to fill the gap between the model and the data. For instance, Campbell 19 Gottschalk and Moffitt (1995) distinguish between temporary and permanent changes in the variance of earnings, and attribute between 1/3 and 1/2 of the increased cross-sectional earnings dispersion of the 1980s to temporary phenomena. The statistical model for incomes proposed in my specification does not distinguish between temporary and permanent changes in inequality (with a value of ρ z = 0.75, everything is very persistent, and nothing is very temporary, nothing is forever): it would be nice to extend the model to account for permanent and transitory components in the income process. 20 After the first draft of this paper had been written, I became aware of a fascinating paper in the marketing literature by Christen and Morgan (2005) that uncovers a causal effect from income inequality to household debt in the U.S. using regression analysis. Regarding the solution method, in the paper I construct a model that is essentially deterministic, and then I hit the economy with a series of unanticipated shocks. A key step is to construct a fully stochastic model, in which the shocks are rationally anticipated and their distribution affects agents' optimal choices. Models of this kind are notoriously difficulty to deal with. The first complication is that it is hard to characterize the stationary wealth distribution in this economy, given the dimensionality of the state space. The second complication is that it is even harder to characterize the dynamics of the model when the idiosyncratic shocks are not identically distributed over time. Krusell and Smith (1998) equality is modeled as permanent, it is hard to make sense of why agents would want eventually to trade more financial assets. For if high risk implies less demand for credit for precautionary motives, it also implies more supply of loanable funds, so that equilibrium gross debt has to weight these two conflicting forces, and the main outcome is a decrease in the equilibrium interest rate, with only minor effects on gross debt. This reinforces the conjecture that the increase in debt of the 1980s and the 1990s is reconcilable with an increase in inequality only insofar as the latter phenomenon is perceived to be persistent, but not permanent.
Appendix A: Data description and treatment Description
• The disposable personal income series are produced by the BEA.
The nominal and real series are available at the FRED2 website respectively at:
-http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/dpi -http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/dpic96
• The ratio between the two series is used to construct the deflator of nominal debt.
• Data on household (end of period, outstanding) debt are from the Flow of Funds Z1 tables. The series is also available through FRED2 at -http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CMDEBT
• Data on loan-to-value ratios are taken from the Federal Housing Finance Board. The loan-to-price ratio measure refers to newly built homes. It is available at:
-http://www.fhfb.gov/GetFile.aspx?FileID=4121
• Data on inequality are from Eckstein and Nagypál (2004) , using data drawn from the March Current Population Survey, and refers to the standard deviation of pre-tax log wages of full-time, full-year male 
Appendix B: Recovering the idiosyncratic shocks Notation and assumptions
This section describes how one can back out the idiosyncratic income shocks that are able to replicate the observed behavior of income dispersion over time. There are N individuals, for T periods.
Starting at time t = 1, I specify the following law of motion for individual incomes:
log y it = log a t + log f i + log z it where f i is an individual specific fixed-effect, a t is a log-normally distributed aggregate disturbance, and the time-varying, individual-specific effect z it follows a process of the form:
log z it = ρ z log z it−1 + e it At t = 1, I normalize log a1 = 0, so the level of aggregate productivity is 1. The other two terms have the following representation:
The variance of the time-varying shocks v t is allowed to change over time, thus affecting the cross-sectional dispersion of earnings over time. The term x t is a time-varying factor that ensures that the mean level of z is unity for all t.
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At time 1 I let the economy to be in steady state, that is, I assume that log at = 0 and ei1 = 0 for all i's.
This implies that:
Backing out the x's and the v's Absent aggregate shocks (which, by construction, do not affect the dispersion of log earnings), it is straightforward to calculate the conditions under which mean level income will be unity for all t. At time t = 2:
Let the economy be in the non-stochastic steady state at time t = 1. At time t = 1, if ei1 = 1 for all i, we have that v 1 = 0 and var (log y1) = s 2 At time t = 2, instead, let v 2 > 0 (notice how this procedure works easily only when income inequality rises from the initial steady state: in periods in which income inequality is low, it needs to be modified to allow for negative correlation between fixed effects and v shocks), so that var (log y2) = s 2 + v 
